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Abstract - Rootkits refer to software that is used to hide the 
presence and activity of malware and permit an attacker to take 
control of a computer system. In our previous work, we focused 
strictly on identifying rootkits that use inline function hooking 
techniques to remain hidden. In this paper, we extend our 
previous work by including rootkits that use other types of 
hooking techniques, such as those that hook the IATs (Import 
Address Tables) and SSDTs (System Service Descriptor Tables). 
Unlike other malware identification techniques, our approach 
involved conducting dynamic analyses of various rootkits and 
then determining the family of each rootkit based on the hooks 
that had been created on the system. We demonstrated the 
effectiveness of this approach by first using the CLOPE 
(Clustering with sLOPE) algorithm to cluster a sample of 
rootkits into several families; next, the ID3 (Iterative 
Dichotomiser 3) algorithm was utilized to generate a decision tree 
for identifying the rootkit that had infected a machine.  
Keywords - computer security; rootkits; data mining 
I. INTRODUCTION
Rootkits refer to software that is used to hide the presence 
and activity of malware (such as viruses, worms and trojans) 
and permit an attacker to take control of a computer system [1]. 
Installing a rootkit is usually the first thing that an attacker will 
do after gaining access to a system, as this will ensure that the 
attack will remain undetected [2]. The attacker can then 
proceed to capture personal data, such as bank account details, 
passwords, and credit card numbers. 
There are clearly two reasons why it is very important to 
conduct research in the area of rootkits: 
1. It is estimated that 85% of malicious software is being 
written today with the intention of generating profit 
for the malware’s author [3]. We are no longer 
dealing with script kiddies just trying to create 
malware for fun, but instead are targeted by organized 
criminal gangs that want to steal money. The 
Symantec Corporation even claims that “cyber crime 
has surpassed illegal drug trafficking as a criminal 
moneymaker” [4]. 
2. There has been an increase of several hundred percent 
in both the number and complexity of rootkits over 
the last few years [5]. Malicious software is already a 
very big worldwide problem and the proliferation of 
rootkits is only going to serve to escalate this problem. 
These two trends are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Rootkits use various types of hooking techniques in order 
to remain hidden and there are several tools available, such as 
McAfee’s Rootkit Detective, that can be used to detect the 
hooks that have been created by a rootkit on a computer 
system. Each time that such a tool is run, a log file is generated 
that contains a list of the detected hooks. The amount of data in 
these log files is overwhelming as they hold information about 
each and every hook that had been detected on the system. On 
average, each of these log files contains several hundred lines 
of data. 
The main contribution of this paper is that we have devised 
a new procedure that can be used to make sense of the vast 
amount of information in these log files. This procedure can 
identify the rootkit that has infected a machine, based on the 
hooks that have been detected. In our previous work [7, 8], we 
focused strictly on identifying rootkits that use inline function 
hooking techniques to remain hidden. In this paper, we extend 
our previous work by including rootkits that use other types of 
hooking techniques, such as those that hook the IATs (Import 
Address Tables) and SSDTs (System Service Descriptor 
Tables). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe 
in the next section three hooking techniques that rootkits use to 
remain hidden. In Section III, we explain the methodology that 
was used to identify the rootkit that has infected a computer 
system. We demonstrated our identification process on a 
sample of rootkits and describe the results of our experiment in 
Section IV. A discussion of some of the related work is 
provided in Section V. Finally, a conclusion to the paper can be 
found in Section VI. 
Figure 1. Visibility of Malware versus Malicious Intent [6] 
This research was supported in part by the Westpac Banking Corporation, 
IBM Australia and the Australian Government. 
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II. ROOTKIT HOOKING TECHNIQUES
As mentioned earlier, rootkits use different types of 
hooking techniques in order to remain hidden. In this paper, we 
focus on three types: inline function hooking, hooking the IAT 
and hooking the SSDT. 
McAfee(R) Rootkit Detective 1.1 scan report 
On 16-11-2009 at 03:17:08 
OS-Version 5.1.2600 
Service Pack 3.0 
==================================== 
Object-Type: IAT/EAT-hook 
PID: 444 
Details: Export : Function  : 
  kernel32.dll!Process32Next => 
  C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll:7C80029C 
Object-Path: C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll 
Status: Hooked 
Figure 2. Inline Function Hook Created by a Qukart Rootkit 
McAfee(R) Rootkit Detective 1.1 scan report 
On 16-11-2009 at 03:25:37 
OS-Version 5.1.2600 
Service Pack 3.0 
==================================== 
Object-Type: IAT/EAT-hook 
PID: 1496 
Details: Import : Function  : 
  SHDOCVW.dll:ADVAPI32.dll!RegEnumValueA 
  Should be : ADVAPI32.dll:77DF9BBF But is : :10414044 
Object-Path: :10414044 
Status: Hooked 
Figure 3. IAT Hook Created by an Alman Rootkit 
McAfee(R) Rootkit Detective 1.1 scan report 
On 16-11-2009 at 03:41:17 
OS-Version 5.1.2600 
Service Pack 3.0 
==================================== 
Object-Type: IAT/EAT-hook 
PID: 1496 
Details: Import : Function  : 
  Explorer.EXE:KERNEL32.dll!LoadLibraryA  
  Should be : KERNEL32.dll:7C801D7B But is    : 
  C:\DOCUME~1\DES\LOCALS~1\Temp\VCab.DLL:00D884E8 
Object-Path: C:\DOCUME~1\DES\LOCALS~1\Temp\VCab.DLL 
Status: Hooked 
Figure 4. IAT Hook Created by a Bacalid/DetNat Rootkit 
McAfee(R) Rootkit Detective 1.1 scan report 
On 16-11-2009 at 03:55:05 
OS-Version 5.1.2600 
Service Pack 3.0 
==================================== 
Object-Type: SSDT-hook 
Object-Name: ZwCreateProcess 
Object-Path: C:\WINDOWS\system32\vdnt32.sys 
Figure 5. SSDT Hook Created by a Haxdoor Rootkit 
A. Inline Function Hooking 
Figure 2 describes one of the many inline function hooks 
that had been created by a Qukart rootkit. These types of hooks 
are created when a rootkit overwrites the first five bytes of an 
API (Application Programming Interface) function with a 
JUMP instruction. The first byte in the function is replaced 
with the value E9, the opcode for a JUMP in assembly 
language, and the remaining four bytes contain a 32-bit address 
of some malicious code. 
From Figure 2, it is evident that the Process32Next API 
function in the Kernel32 DLL (Dynamic-Link Library) file had 
been hooked. This API function had been exported by the 
Kernel32 DLL file to the MsgSys Windows process (Process 
IDentifier 444). Whenever this particular API function was 
called, some malicious code at address 7C80029C was run. 
B. Hooking the IAT 
Figures 3 and 4 describe two of the many IAT hooks that 
had been created by an Alman rootkit and by a Bacalid/DetNat 
rootkit, respectively. These types of hooks are created when a 
rootkit overwrites the address of an API function in the IAT. 
Figure 3 is an example of a hook in which the IAT of a DLL 
file had been modified and Figure 4 is an example of a hook in 
which the IAT of an EXE (EXEcutable) process had been 
modified. 
Figure 3 shows that the Explorer Windows process 
(Process IDentifier 1496) depends on the Shdocvw DLL file. 
This Shdocvw DLL file, in turn, needs to import the 
RegEnumValueA API function from the Advapi DLL file. The 
Alman rootkit had managed to create a hook by overwriting the 
address of the RegEnumValueA function in the IAT of the 
Shdocvw DLL file: the address should have been 77DF9BBF 
but had been changed to 10414044. 
From Figure 4, it is clear that the Explorer Windows 
process (Process IDentifier 1496) needs to import the 
LoadLibraryA API function from the Kernel32 DLL file. The 
Bacalid/DetNat rootkit had managed to create a hook by 
overwriting the address of the LoadLibraryA function in the 
IAT of the Explorer Windows Process: the address should have 
been 7C801D7B but had been changed to 00D884E8.   
C. Hooking the SSDT 
Figure 5 describes one of several SSDT hooks that had 
been created by a Haxdoor rootkit. System services refer to 
undocumented API functions for the Windows operating 
system that are callable from user mode [9]. From Figure 5, for 
example, ZwCreateProcess is the internal system service that 
the CreateProcess API function calls to create a new process. A 
system service call is thus a mechanism that allows a user 
mode application to access the operating system’s kernel [10]. 
The SSDT contains a list of pointers with the addresses of 
the internal kernel function that implements the corresponding 
service [9, 10, 11]. A rootkit can intercept calls that are made to 
a specific system service by replacing the SSDT entry with the 
address of its own code. After this rootkit code is executed, the 
original system service can be called or some fabricated data 
can be returned instead [11, 12]. 
Figure 6. Methodology 
III. METHODOLOGY
Having described the various rootkit hooking techniques in 
the previous section, we now explain our procedure that can be 
used to identify the rootkit that has infected a computer system. 
There are several steps involved in the process and these are 
illustrated in Figure 6. 
A. Controlled Environment for Conducting Dynamic 
Analyses of Rootkits 
It was first necessary to set up a controlled environment for 
conducting a dynamic analysis of rootkits. Since the Windows 
family accounts for approximately 90% of the operating 
systems in use today [13], we decided to focus exclusively on 
rootkits that target those systems. Ubuntu was chosen as the 
host operating system as it was felt that it was unlikely that a 
Windows rootkit could cause damage to a Linux-based 
operating system. 
Within the Windows family of operating systems, 
Windows XP is by far the most popular [13]; thus, Sun 
Microsystem’s VirtualBox was installed to create a virtual 
environment for testing rootkits and we installed XP as a guest 
operating system inside that virtual environment. 
We obtained 100 rootkit samples from the Offensive 
Computing website (http://www.offensivecomputing.net) and 
ran each sample, one by one, in the virtual environment. After 
running each sample, we restored the system back to its 
original settings. 
B. Rootkit Hook Detector for Collecting Data 
There are several tools that can be used to detect the hooks 
that have been created by a rootkit on a Windows machine; we 
chose to use McAfee’s Rootkit Detective (available from 
http://vil.nai.com) to accomplish this task. After running each 
of the rootkit samples in the Windows XP virtual environment, 
the Rootkit Detective was then run to detect the hooks that had 
been created and a log file containing data about each of these 
hooks was generated. Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 are extracts from 
these log files.  
C. Parser for Extracting Essential Information 
The log files contained a fair amount of redundant 
information and the next step involved extracting just the 
essential information about each of the hooks from the files. 
The exact information that was extracted depended on the type 
of hook that was detected. Pyroto’s Parse-O-Matic parser 
(available from http://www.parse-o-matic.com) was used to 
extract this data from the log files. 
• For inline function hooks, the Process IDentifier and 
the API function name were extracted. Thus, the 
following data would have been obtained from Figure 
2: 
  444  |  Process32Next      
• For IAT hooks, the Process IDentifier, the hooked 
DLL/EXE name, and the API function name were 
extracted. Thus, the following data would have been 
obtained from Figure 3: 
  1496  |  Shdocvw.dll  |  RegEnumValueA   
and the following data would have been obtained 
from Figure 4: 
  1496  |  Explorer.exe  |  LoadLibraryA   
• For SSDT hooks, just the API function name was 
extracted. Thus, the following data would have been 
obtained from Figure 5: 
  ZwCreateProcess   
D. Spreadsheet for Constructing Dataset 
After examining the log files from each of the 100 rootkit 
samples, it was determined that a total of 12472 hooks had 
been detected. From these 12472 hooks, we were able to find 
1357 unique hooks. Thus, using a spreadsheet, a large table 
with 100 rows (one row for each rootkit) and 1357 columns 
(one column for each unique hook) was then constructed. The 
table contained 0/1 binary values, with a 1 meaning that a 
particular rootkit had managed to create a certain hook. The 
binary data from the spreadsheet’s table was then used to create 
a dataset. The dataset, therefore, consisted of 100 instances and 
1357 attributes. 
E. Data Mining Software for Analysing Dataset 
Having generated a dataset, we subsequently used the 
Wakaito Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) to 
examine it [14]. The results of this analysis are described in the 
next section. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Just to reiterate, the primary objective of this research was 
to be able to identify the rootkit that has infected a system. 
Prior to explaining how one can identify the rootkit, it is first 
essential that we demonstrate how a sample of rootkits can be 
clustered into different families. This step is necessary as it will 
Dynamic Analysis 
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Extraction of Essential Information 
Construction of Dataset 
Analysis of Dataset 
show that the variants within each rootkit family have similar 
hooking patterns.  
Thus, in subsection A, we reveal a procedure that can be 
used to cluster the 100 instances in the dataset (which represent 
the 100 rootkit samples) into different families. Having some 
knowledge of the hooking patterns of each family, we then 
show how a decision tree could be used to identify the rootkit 
that has infected a system, and this is described in 
subsection B. 
A. Clustering 
Dividing the 100 rootkit samples into different families was 
a two-step process. The first step involved breaking up the 
samples into groups based on the type of hooks that each 
particular rootkit had created. The samples were broken up into 
the following five groups: 
• Inline function hooks only (67 samples) 
• IAT hooks only (7 samples) 
• SSDT hooks only (9 samples) 
• Inline function and SSDT hooks (11 samples) 
• IAT and SSDT hooks (6 samples) 
It should be pointed out that we did not find any rootkits that 
had created both inline function and IAT hooks. 
TABLE I. CLUSTERING RESULTS
Family 
Number 
Family 
Name 
Type 
of 
Hooks 
Number
of 
Samples 
F01 Papras 
Inline & 
SSDT 
4
F02 Haxdoor-A SSDT 1 
F03 Bacalid/DetNat IAT 6 
F04 Haxdoor-B 
Inline & 
SSDT 
7
F05 Agent IAT 1 
F06 Alman-A SSDT 8 
F07 Feebs-A Inline 14 
F08 Qukart Inline 18 
F09 Virut Inline 21 
F10 Feebs-B Inline 1 
F11 Alman-B 
IAT & 
SSDT 
6
F12 ProAgent Inline 5 
F13 DNSChanger Inline 6 
F14 Banker Inline 2 
The second step involved breaking up these five groups 
into smaller groups using a clustering algorithm. We intended 
to use an unsupervised clustering model since the instances had 
not been labeled. One of the most common clustering 
algorithms is the k-means algorithm, but a disadvantage of this 
algorithm is that the number of clusters needs to be specified 
a priori.
The EM (Expectation-Maximization) clustering algorithm, 
on the other hand, can find the optimum number of clusters 
automatically using a cross validation procedure. We attempted 
to cluster the 100 rootkit samples using this EM algorithm but 
were not too pleased with the results. This algorithm resulted in 
too few clusters: some clusters contained rootkits from two or 
more different families and should have been broken up into 
even smaller clusters. 
The CLOPE (Clustering with sLOPE) algorithm, however, 
did provide some much better results. Like the EM algorithm, 
the CLOPE algorithm can also find the most suitable number 
of clusters automatically. The CLOPE algorithm proved to be 
an appropriate choice for analyzing our dataset. As mentioned 
earlier,  
• Our dataset consisted of 0/1 binary values. 
• Over 90% of the values in the dataset were zero. 
• Each instance in the dataset contained 1357 attributes. 
The CLOPE algorithm is an appropriate choice for examining 
sparse datasets with high dimension and containing boolean 
values [15]. The algorithm was available for implementation in 
WEKA. 
The CLOPE algorithm contained a repulsion parameter, 
which is used to control the level of intra-cluster similarity [14, 
15]. We used the default repulsion value of 2.6 for our analysis. 
Using this algorithm to cluster each of the five groups resulted 
in a total of 14 smaller groups. We refer to these smaller groups 
as families and list them in Table I. 
It was then necessary to validate these results. We needed 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of this clustering algorithm; in 
other words, we needed to confirm that the rootkit samples 
within each family had something in common. Had the 
algorithm generated meaningful families? To answer this 
question, we proceeded by labeling the rootkit samples using 
several different antivirus scanners. 
There are numerous online antivirus file scanners that can 
be used to label suspicious files. We chose to use VirusTotal’s 
Online Virus and Malware Scan (available from 
http://www.virustotal.com). Once a file is uploaded to this 
website, the file is quickly scanned and the website then returns 
labels from 39 different antivirus scanners for that file. A list of 
these scanners is provided in Table II. 
Bailey et al. [16] had pointed out that for each malware 
sample in the wild, there exist a variety of labels that have been 
chosen by the various antivirus vendors. Thus, when presented 
with 39 labels for each of our rootkit samples, we decided to 
choose the label that appeared most frequently. Once we had a 
label for each rootkit sample, we then verified that all the 
samples within each family had identical labels. This label that 
was common to all members of the family was obviously 
selected as the name of the family and recorded in Table I. It is 
worth noting that other researchers, such as Bayer et al. [17], 
also used the labels from several different antivirus scanners to 
validate their clustering results. 
TABLE II. VIRUSTOTAL’S ANTIVIRUS SCANNERS
AhnLab               
(V3) 
Eset Software  
(ESET NOD32) 
Norman         
(Norman Antivirus) 
Antiy Labs         
(Antiy-AVL) 
Fortinet       
(Fortinet) 
Panda Security 
(Panda Platinum) 
Aladdin             
(eSafe) 
FRISK Software     
(F-Prot) 
PC Tools    
(PCTools) 
ALWIL               
(Avast! Antivirus) 
F-Secure             
(F-Secure) 
Prevx             
(Prevx1) 
Authentium 
(Command Antivirus) 
G DATA Software 
(GData) 
Rising Antivirus 
(Rising) 
AVG Technologies 
(AVG) 
Hacksoft            
(The Hacker) 
Secure Computing 
(SecureWeb) 
Avira               
(AntiVir) 
Hauri          
(ViRobot) 
BitDefender GmbH 
(BitDefender) 
Cat Computer 
Services (Quick Heal) 
Ikarus Software 
(Ikarus) 
Sophos              
(SAV) 
ClamAV        
(ClamAV) 
INCA Internet 
(nProtect) 
Sunbelt Software 
(Antivirus) 
Comodo       
(Comodo) 
K7 Computing 
(K7AntiVirus) 
Symantec        
(Norton Antivirus) 
CA Inc.               
(Vet) 
Kaspersky Lab  
(AVP) 
VirusBlokAda 
(VBA32) 
Doctor Web, Ltd. 
(DrWeb) 
McAfee   
(VirusScan) 
Trend Micro 
(TrendMicro) 
Emsi Software GmbH 
(a-squared) 
Microsoft     
(Malware Protection) 
VirusBuster 
(VirusBuster) 
This same procedure to verify the effectiveness of the 
CLOPE algorithm had also been used to confirm that the EM 
algorithm had NOT generated proper clusters. We noticed, for 
example, that the EM algorithm had inappropriately grouped 
the samples from families F03 and F05 into the same cluster. 
B. Decision Tree 
Having successfully completed the intermediate step of 
categorizing the 100 rootkit samples into 14 families, the next 
objective was to develop a procedure that would identify the 
rootkit that had infected a system. With some knowledge of the 
hooking patterns of each rootkit family, we could now 
construct a decision tree that could be used to find the attributes 
that would differentiate between the different families of 
rootkits. 
To construct the decision tree, it was first necessary to 
make some slight modifications to the original dataset. The 
original dataset had consisted of 100 instances and 1357 
attributes. We added one more attribute to our dataset: this 
1358th attribute contained the name of the family that the 
rootkit belonged to. We also added one more instance to the 
dataset: this 101st instance contained all zero values and 
represented the situation in which none of the 1357 hooks had 
been detected. This 101st instance was placed in and was the 
only member of a family called F00.  
The ID3 (Iterative Dichotomiser 3) algorithm was then used 
to analyze the modified dataset and create a decision tree. The 
primary objective of any type of decision tree classification is 
to iteratively partition the dataset into subsets and eventually 
end up with final subsets in which all elements belong to the 
same class. With the ID3 algorithm, the basic strategy when 
splitting the dataset is to choose attributes that have the highest 
information gain. [18, 19] 
Figure 7. Decision Tree to Identify Rootkit Infections 
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TABLE III. DESCRIPTION OF ATTRIBUTES
Attribute 
Hook 
Type 
Windows 
Process 
Hooked
DLL 
API
Function 
130 Inline Explorer  FindNextFileW
1355 SSDT   ZwQueryDirectoryFile
4 Inline Svchost  FindNextFileW
16 Inline Svchost  Process32Next
1345 SSDT   ZwClose
127 Inline Explorer  FindFirstFileA
11 Inline Svchost  NtDeleteValueKey
5 Inline Svchost  HttpSendRequestA
862 IAT Explorer Advapi32 FindFirstFileW
91 Inline DefWatch  FindFirstFileA
853 IAT Explorer AcGenral FindFirstFileW
1 Inline Svchost  EnumServicesStatusA
852 IAT Explorer AcGenral RegOpenKeyW
1356 SSDT   ZwQuerySystemInformation
Like the CLOPE clustering algorithm, the ID3 algorithm 
was also suitable for examining a dataset containing many 
binary attributes [14, 18]. Figure 7 illustrates the decision tree 
that was generated by the ID3 algorithm after implementation 
in WEKA. Leaves F01, F02, F03 … F14 in the decision tree 
correspond to the 14 families in Table I. If one traverses the 
decision tree and arrives at the F00 leaf, this could mean either 
one of two things: 
1. The rootkit had not created any hooks (the system had 
possibly not been infected by a rootkit). 
2. The hooks that had been created by the rootkit were 
different from the ones being tested for. This might 
suggest that we are dealing with a brand new rootkit. 
As mentioned earlier, the original dataset consisted of 1357 
attributes, each representing a particular hook. To simplify 
matters, it would be sufficient to give the details of just those 
14 attributes in Figure 7 that are needed to identify the family 
of a rootkit that has infected a system, and this information is 
provided in Table III. The 14 attributes in Table III were 
chosen by the ID3 algorithm as being the most significant 
attributes for determining the family of a rootkit infection 
In summary, after running a tool such as McAfee’s Rootkit 
Detective, the decision tree in Figure 7 along with the 
information contained in Table III could then be used to 
identify the rootkit that has infected a system. 
V. RELATED WORK
Schultz et al. [20], Kolter and Maloof [21] and Siddiqui et 
al. [22] used data mining techniques for the purpose of 
identifying malicious software. Their approaches involved 
static analyses of malicious executables files that might arrive, 
for example, as email attachments. The intention was to be able 
to catch these files before they had a chance to run on and 
possibly cause damage to a system. A significant problem for 
this type of static analysis approach is that 80 to 90 percent of 
malware in the wild is either encrypted or packed [23, 24]. 
By taking a dynamic analysis approach to identifying 
rootkits, we avoided this major challenge of dealing with 
encrypted or packed malware samples. Our goal, on the other 
hand, attempted to address a situation that a system 
administrator might be faced with when he or she finds a 
machine behaving abnormally because of a rootkit infection. 
His or her immediate concern would be to try to determine 
what he or she was dealing with, and our system tries to tackle 
this concern. 
There have been other groups of researchers, such as Bailey 
et al. [16], Rieck et al. [25] and Bayer et al. [17], whose work 
was more like ours in that they too collected malware samples, 
performed a dynamic analysis of each sample in a controlled 
environment, and eventually ended up with clusters of families. 
The objective of these researchers was to cluster malware 
samples based on the behavior of each sample: they attempted 
to identify the distinctive behavioral features of each malware 
family. Yin et al. [26] conducted a dynamic analysis of various 
malware samples with the objective of detecting the hooks that 
had been created on a system. Their innovative technique could 
be used to identify new hooking techniques, as well. Our 
approach was closely related to that of these four groups of 
researchers but more focused, as we concentrated strictly on 
rootkits and used the hooks that had been created by these 
rootkits to differentiate between the various families. 
VI. CONCLUSION
With an increasing amount of malware adopting rootkit 
technologies to evade antivirus software, further research into 
defenses against rootkit attacks is absolutely essential. In this 
paper, we focused on rootkits that use inline function, IAT and 
SSDT hooking techniques to remain hidden. There are several 
tools available, such as McAfee’s Rootkit Detective, that can 
be used to detect these types of hooks, but these tools cannot 
identify the rootkits. The main contribution of this paper is that 
we have developed a new procedure that will enhance these 
currently available tools for detecting the hooks on a system. 
This procedure would identify the family of the rootkit as well, 
and this knowledge would certainly help the administrator of 
that system in deciding how to proceed. 
To demonstrate our approach, we conducted dynamic 
analyses of 100 rootkit samples in a controlled environment. It 
was determined that these rootkits had created a total of 12472 
hooks. Based on the hooks that had been created by each 
rootkit, we were then able to categorize these samples into 14 
families using an unsupervised clustering algorithm. Next, the 
labels from 39 different antivirus scanners were used to verify 
the effectiveness of this algorithm. Having successfully 
categorized the samples into families, a decision tree was then 
generated that could be used to identify the family of the 
rootkit.  
Being able to identify rootkit infections would mean that 
half the battle against these extremely sophisticated forms of 
malware would be won. Since we have shown that the variants 
within a particular rootkit family have similar hooking patterns, 
the procedure that we have presented in this paper could also 
be used to very quickly identify newly released variants from 
that family. Hence, we envision that this procedure will lead to 
the development of better tools for identifying the rootkit that 
has infected a system.  
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